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Abstract
In this study I took a normative approach to examine the performance of the
Indonesian Press in the era of decentralization. My approach included intensive
observations on the Indonesia press system and survey among 330 Indonesian
journalists and 55 head regencies and 55 regency’s secretaries. My analysis of the
data and their context revealed the professionalism of Indonesian journalists. In
their own opinion, the Indonesian journalists had a high level of professionalism.
However, the bureaucrats questioned their self-assurance. Therefore, it was difficult
to determine the actual level of professionalism of the Indonesian Journalists
throughout the many regions in Indonesia. Fortunately, the Indonesian journalists
were free to report news according to the values in which they believed. Based on
this condition, the Indonesia press owners no longer had to fulfill the political
and commercial imperative functions of the press. The Indonesian press did not limit
itself to report political news, but also cultural news to improve of life of
Indonesian citizens. In conclusion, I consider that the Indonesian press has moved
beyond its imperative function.
Keywords: the Indonesian press, era of decentralization, professionalism, the
Indonesian journalists, and imperative function.
Introduction
May 21, 1998 ranks as one of the most important dates in Indonesia's history,
when university students led public demonstrations that forced Suharto to resign from
the Presidency, to be replaced by B. J Habibie. The date is now seen as the first step in
Indonesia's reformation on the road to becoming a genuine democracy. Many other
steps still needed to be made by government and in law enforcement to regain public
trust and establish social and individual liberty. The Indonesian Knowledge
Organization (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, or LIPI) has laid down eight
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2points of reformation that needed to be implemented by the government regarding the
change of the president of the Indonesian Republic (KAGAMA 1988: 4). These eight
agendas items included: (i) political reformation; (ii) economic reformation; (iii)
human resource and educational reformation; (iv) rule of law and human rights
reformation; (v) revitalization of technology; (vi) socio-cultural reformation; (vii)
security and defense reformation, and refunctionalization of the armed forces (ABRI);
and (viii) reformation of communications system, including the press and broader
public media system.
When Suharto took over as President of Indonesia in 1967, he named his new
administration 'The New Order' (Orde Baru) to distinguish it from the 'Old Order'
regime of Soekarno. The designation 'New Order' was publicized and implemented by
every governmental official and by the military, so the term became ubiquitous in all
aspects of political, social, and economic life. During the three decades of the New
Order era, the press became known as 'the Pancasila press', defined at the 25th Press
Council Assembly (Sidang Dewan Pers), Solo 1984, as a press "whose' attitude and
behaviour are oriented to the values of Pancasila and the Fundamental Constitution of
1945" as "a healthy, free and responsible press, developing a trustworthy atmosphere
towards a democratic and transparent society, with a positive interaction mechanism
between the press and the government and with the community" (Rachmadi
1990:197-198). This formulation, however, does not explain to whom the Indonesian
press must be responsible and by what means it should be monitored. In practice, the
press became totally dominated by government oversight and control, and was
required to carry out its duties according to the government's demands and political
interests. The Department of Information closely monitored and restrained what could
and could not to be reported. In consequence, the Indonesian press was only allowed to
carry out its 'imperative function' within the rigid guidelines laid down by the
government.
The post-Suharto governments took remarkably swift actions in regard to press
reformasi. For example, on June 5, 1998, Yunus Yosfiah, then Minister of Information
(Menteri Penerangan, -MENPEN) called off the SK Menpen No. 1/1984 ('Minister of
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Newspapers Press Publishing Operation Permit (SIUPP) at any time. Yunus Yosfiah
also cancelled SK Menpen No. 47/1975 and SK Menpen No. 184/1978, requiring all
journalists to belong to the government-controlled Indonesian Journalists Union (PWI,
Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia), the Newspaper Publishers Union (SPS, Serikat
Penerbit Surat kabar), and the Grafika Press Union (SGP, Serikat Grafika Pers). They
were now free to establish and join their own professional organizations. Then, on
September 23, 1999, President Habibie, endorsed Law No. 40/1999, the first media law
to explicitly guarantees the freedom of the press in Indonesia. Section 4 established
freedom of the media as a 'basic human right', and Section 5 made it clear that the
Indonesian media are allowed to report on events and opinions, including the norms of
religion and social ethics, and that they should adhere to the principle that an accused
individual must be regarded as "innocent until charged and convicted," thus requiring
the Indonesian media to respect human rights and the rule of law.
Habibie's successor as President, Abdurrahman Wahid, continued the
reformation of the Indonesian press. In November 1999 he disbanded the Department
of Information, issuing never -before-imagined freedom for the Indonesian press.
There were no longer to be governmental agencies to control or restrain the liberty of
Indonesian press. Wahid also endorsed the principle of a participatory and democratic
media, according to which individuals, businesses, local communities or social
organizations were allowed to establish and operate their own press media (McQuail
1994: 132). It is possible that Wahid had not heard of democratic-participant media
theory, but his disbanding of the Department of Information showed his determination
to create a more democratic society by enabling a small-scale, interactive and
participatory press to emerge and develop without government oversight or hindrance.
This certainly benefited the nation, and especially the local communities, and
both minority and majority groups, given the need to disseminate political, economic,
legal, cultural and community information essential to the functioning of an open and
participatory democracy. Although Wahid was only in office for 20 months (October
1999 to July 2001), he was able to validate the philosophy and practice of
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central government's authority to local regencies and municipalities. In taking over the
functions of the central government agencies, these local governments utilized many
civil society components, including the press, to disseminate information and
influence public opinion. The Indonesian press also finally had the chance to monitor
and comment on local politics, and conduct checks and balances on government
behaviour and policy-making. A question that arises from these dramatic events is:
How has the Indonesian press performed under its new freedom and public
responsibility in this era of reform, democracy, and decentralization?
The Changing Imperative Functions of the Indonesian Press
At least two different approaches can be identified in evaluating press reporting,
each linked to a different media function or imperative. The first assesses the media's
'normative content', the second its 'business aspect' or profitability. In Indonesia, until
recently, the normative aspect included adhering to stringent government guidelines
and censorship. However, in the new reformasi and otonomi era, the Indonesian press
no longer functions as an agent of the bureaucracy. Research findings from a 2002
survey, covering 155 local districts in Indonesia, found that press readership also
regards newspapers as 'cultural entities', so the Indonesian press performance should
also be evaluated as cultural institutions.
Following Suharto's resignation, anyone was free to launch a newspaper or
other publication. Although facing an economic crisis, there has been great
enthusiasm for publishing new press and other media outlets. Since Suharto' s
resignation to April 15, 1999, the Department of Information approved 415 SIUPP -
Press Publication Permits (Suranto et.al. 1999: 17), and until April 15, 1999, it had
approved 852 SIUPP. As the government no longer curbs the operations of the
Indonesian press, many publications were launched not only to disseminate
information and express opinions, but also to make a profit, as more people now enjoy
reading newspapers and magazines, and the media is quick to respond to people's
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according to consumer psychology and sociographic inclinations. As Ashadi Siregar
has observed, the press saw the society merely as consumers (1999: 96), and the many
press outlets were competing energetically to satisfy and extend their readership. The
type of news considered to be of 'high quality', therefore, is that which most pleases
and attracts its readers. To create a successful product, the reporters and editorial staff
look for news that meets this criterion. It thus must be conceded that the press has
increasingly applied the principle of 'press comodification' in conducting its business.
This reality is valid because, in addition to being a political organ, a newspaper is an
economic enterprise that must make a profit it is to survive. Substantial capital has
been invested in establishing the business, which must cover operating costs and show
an adequate return to investors in a limited amount of time. The press must thus also
operate under this 'economic imperative'.
A popular perception exists that, in the era of decentralization, the money
making imperative of press owners has intensified, and that 'standards' have
deteriorated due to an increased exphasis and content being devoted to entertainment,
sensationalism, sordid events, titillation and various degrees of 'pornography' (as
variously defined by different groups of readers). However, a survey of 330 journalists
in 155 regencies and cities in 25 provinces, conducted February-April 2001 by the
Center for Population and Policy Studies, Gadjah Mada University (CPPS 2002),
revealed a very different interpretation of press performance and purposes. According
to respondents, the Indonesian press is significantly fulfilling a socially responsible,
normative or moral function. The findings are summarized in the following section.
Such surveys of journalists and studies of Indonesian press performance are relatively
rare, and this preliminary effort to examine the performance of Indonesian press
during the early years of the reformasi era is thus both pioneering and
thought-provoking.
Indonesian Press Reporting in the Decentralization Era
The GMU survey of journalists asked the 330 respondents to assign a 'low,
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2001: (1) political news, (2) KKN (corruption, collusion, nepotism), (3) community
protest against public regulations or proposing new regulations, (4) poverty issues,
and (5) social conflicts. The findings are summarized in Table 1 below, where the data
show the percentage of the sample of respondents who assessed that their papers had
assigned low, medium, or high coverage of the respective topics, and distinguishing
newspapers published in Java and those published Outside Java.
Table 1: Survey of Journalist Assessments
of their Newspaper's Coverage of Selected Topics
Java Newspapers Outside Java Newspapers
Low
coverage
Medium
Coverage
High
coverage
Low
coverage
Medium
coverage
High
coverage
1. Political News 10.3 47.1 42.6 8.9 42.0 49.1
2. KKN 11.6 31.6 56.8 21.4 24.7 53.9
3. Community Reform 5.8 19.4 74.8 18.4 21.7 59.9
4. Poverty Issues 16.1 36.1 47.8 18.4 28.6 53.0
5. Social Conflicts 45.4 29.6 25.0 47.3 34.1 18.6
Source: Data selected from ‘Survey on Good Governance and Decentralization in
Indonesia', Center for Population and Policy Studies, Gadjah Mada University, 2002
Notes: (i) 'Political news' mainly involves reports on politicians, political parties.
elections, etc; (ii) 'KKN' is the Indonesian acronym for 'corruption, collusion and
nepotism'; (iii) 'Community reform' covers two survey questions that had the same
responses: reports of community protests of public regulations and reports of
community efforts to propose a new regulation; (iv) ‘Poverty issues’ includes reports
on poverty incidence and causes, as well as government and other efforts to alleviate
poverty; (v) 'Social conflicts' includes reports on intra-community conflicts (e.g. ethnic
or religious communities), and also inter-agency conflicts (e.g. between adjacent
regencies, or between regencies, provincial or central government agencies).
1. Political news (line 1 of Table 1) appears to have somewhat higher relative press
coverage Outside Java than in Java, possibly reflecting a relatively higher
familiarity (or public contempt) for political skirmishing in Java, or perhaps due to
7more alternative channels there through which to obtain political information.
There are many other qualitative and impressionistic indications that the people
were getting bored with the bombardment of political news being reported in the
period between the launch of reformasi and the eventual implementation of
decentralization.
2. KKN news (line 2) shows a higher press interest in covering 'corruption, collusion
and nepotism' than general political news, and an apparent higher intensity of
interest in Java than Outside Java. Such news evidently has a higher prurient or
sensationalist public appeal, but it can also be taken as evidence that the press
revelations were reminding the public of the extent of the problem and its social
costs. It also implicitly conveyed the warning that those guilty of KKN are likely to
be exposed and shamed by such press reports. In this regard, the Indonesian press
could be said to be performing its moral function, despite the fact that many KKN
suspects have been able to avoid being fully investigated and penalized.
3. News coverage of community protest and proposals for reform (line 3) has the
highest reporting density, with more newspapers in Java having 'high coverage' and
fewer with 'low coverage' than Outside Java. Some of this coverage was actually
encouraging local communities, NGOs and other civil society groups, to protest
unfair or antiquated public regulations urgently in need of reform or updating, and
again shows the press making a positive contribution in alerting the community that
they need not just accept public regulations imposed by various levels of
government, and encouraging an active civil society participation in public affairs.
From personal experience, I believe that Indonesian journalists tend to have an
individual 'special passion' in reporting news, beyond general news value or
directives that come from their superiors. Many were drawn into the profession as
advocates of political or social reform and this may explain (or 'subjectively
account for') the high ranking given this particular topic. Positive press coverage of
public demonstrations and grass-roots initiatives to promote reform can thus be
seen as encouraging or inciting individuals and community organizations to get
more involved in the process of political and social reform. In this way, the press
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elitist hegemony and frequent aloofness of politicians towards community-level
needs and problems. This role can be criticized as being partisan and non-objective,
or lauded as appropriate in helping the Indonesian people to create a vision and
achieve a consensus on the nation's reformasi agenda, thus helping to realize the
hopes and aspirations of community groups and individuals (e.g. in promoting
gender equity, religious tolerance, social cohesion and collaboration). However,
this conclusion needs to be further confirmed by opinion surveys in the various
communities, as the respondents who provided the information in the present
survey were all journalists (and could be suspected of being self--serving and
self-idealizing). This underscores the need for more surveys of press performance
and public attitudes toward it, using more detailed and quantitative assessments of
topic coverage and of content analysis (e.g. distinguishing objective reporting and
normative commentary).
4. News on poverty issues (line 4) shows moderate levels of coverage, with slightly
more 'high coverage' and more 'low coverage' in newspapers Outside Java than in
Java, presumably reflecting the greater diversity of 'rich resource' and 'poor
resource' provinces in the Outer Islands, and perhaps the 'over-exposure' (and
disenchantment) of Javanese citizens with government poverty alleviation policies
and projects. This, however, is mere speculation in the absence of more detailed
content analysis and public opinion surveys. On the other hand, poverty is such an
all-pervasive issue that its concerns can also be covered as part of news coverage of
politics, community protest and civil society activism, and social conflicts, under
all of which the Indonesian press can fulfill its moral imperative of helping focus
public interest and political concern on the problems of the poor and disadvantaged
groups in society.
5. News on social conflicts, (line 5) rather surprisingly shows the lowest relative
coverage in Java and even somewhat lower Outside Java. The types of conflict
being reported were also very diverse, which, among several other dimensions,
could be construed to include: intra-community conflicts (among ethnic, religious,
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communities and local government, political party conflicts, local executive versus
legislative council conflicts, inter-regency conflicts, and regency-provincial,
central government conflicts. There may thus have been some ambiguity or
confusion among respondents in 'aggregating' their perceptions of what constituted
'social conflicts' for purposes of the survey. Moreover, such reporting might either
have incited social tensions and polarization, or it could was helped to be
conciliatory in helping the adversaries understand the different views and interest
involved and in finding compromise solutions. From a random examination of such
reporting, it would appear that reporters in general were not driven by a normative
imperative to cover such issues (as they might have been in regard to political,
KKN, community-wide protest, and poverty reporting), but were more often
responding to the need to explain the sources of social tension or violence that was
threatening community and national security and demanded urgent attention. If this
interpretation is valid, the Indonesian press could have shown itself capable of
objective and socially responsible performance, being willing to involve itself in
reporting on sensitive and controversial issues, helping to inform, educate and
secure the best interests of the people. Overall, these preliminary survey findings
suggest that Indonesian journalists and their newspapers did not generally have a
partisan or normative starting point in deciding priorities in topic coverage, but
rather paid attention to what their audiences really needed (or wanted to read). The
press seems to have been motivated at least to some degree to report on social
change, protest, and malfeasance, making a genuine effort to inform and educate
the public. This would seem to indicate that the Indonesian press had thus recreated
itself as a 'cultural institution' and an instrument of social change and reformasi. It
should once again be emphasized that these findings are more significant in their
pioneering effort, in raising the issues of press performance, motivation, topic
coverage, and possible bias, and in blazing the trail for more detailed, quantitative
and probing analysis of the role of the press in Indonesia's newly emerging
democratic, decentralized, transparent, and accountable political, social, and
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economic system.
Journalist Professionalism in the Era of Decentralization
Conceptually, it seems clear that the information reported by the Indonesian
press can motivate people and facilitate reformasi and initiate change in the community.
This is possible because: (i) it transfers new information to its readers, (ii) it has access
to more information of a broader variety than do individuals or the local communities,
and (iii) it can mirror and project the 'reality of events' and developments in the nation
and in the local community to the citizens, local community leaders, social activists,
politicians and bureaucrats at all levels of government. However, in order to gather
such information and properly disseminate it, the Indonesian press must have
'professional journalists', with 'professionalism' defined by a journalist's competence in
gathering information, analyzing it, and being able to report it accurately and
understandably, and by doing all this while adhering to a 'journalist code of ethics'. If
an individual has the required competence and instinctively abides by such a code of
ethics, he or she can rightfully be called 'a professional journalist'.
Journalism can sometimes be a dangerous profession. In general, however, a
professional journalist usually does not experience violence, because attacks on
journalists most often occur due to technical difficulties associated with the
relationship of the journalist with the subject of his or her reporting, or with an
informant. It would seem to be true that the more unprofessional this relationship, the
greater the risk of violence a journalist is likely to face. An important question is thus:
Have Indonesian journalists become more professional in the era of decentralization?
Journalist's responses from the same survey are tabulated in Table 2.
From Table 2, it appears that a larger percentage of journalists are regarded by
their peers as 'semi--professional' rather than 'professional', though the size of the two
categories are remarkably close.
The percentage of journalists judged to be professional is almost exactly the
same in both regions, with Java assessed as having more 'semi-professionals' and
Outside Java seen as having a larger share of 'non-professionals' 'Semi-professionals'
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can include academics and other urban intellectuals, of whom there is probably a
higher density in Java, and there are more newspapers and other media there than
Outside Java to which they have access. When a bureaucrat intimidates a journalist
who is gathering public information, he or she 'violates' the journalist. When a
bureaucrat forces a journalist to publish a specific piece of misinformation, that also is
a violation of the journalist's integrity. Such violations can also involve bribery,
intimidation, or veiled or open threats of imprisonments or even assassination.
However, journalists who were violated in this way may also be culpable in being
'unprofessional' in that they lacked the ethical standards, skills or motivation to resist
the threats, or to take available means to counter them in this new age of freedom,
accountability and media freedom.
Table 2: The Perceived Professionalism of Indonesian Journalists
According to Journalists
(How would you Rank the Professionalism of Indonesian Journalists?)
Inside Java Outside Java
Professional Semi-
Professional
Non-
Professional
Professional
Semi-
professional
Non-
Professional
41.5% 48.7% 9.8% 41.4% 44.7% 13.9%
According to Bureaucrats
(Do you regard Journalist's Behaviour as Professional?)
Inside Java Outside Java
“Yes”: 25.4% “No”: 74.6% “Yes”: 22.8% “No”: 77.2%
Source: Governance and Decentralization Survey: Questionnaire for print journalists,
and also for Bupati ('regents') and Walikota ('mayors').
Some information on how professional journalists appear to bureaucrats is
shown in Table 2, based on responses of 55 heads of regencies and 55 regency
secretaries. In this survey, respondents were simply asked to answer yes or no to the
question whether, from their experience, they assessed journalists to have behaved
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professionally. Journalist professionalism was established by two criteria: journalistic
skills, and obedience to 'news limits' (i.e. observance of the law, journalistic ethics, and
an appropriate journalist code of conduct). The findings for Java and Outside Java are
very similar, with three-quarters of bureaucrats judging journalists to be behaving
unprofessionally, and with slightly more bureaucrats Outside Java concurring with this
negative assessment. Comparing the two sections of Table 2, it is evident that there is a
glaring difference in perception between the opinions of bureaucrats and how
journalists see themselves. How can we account for this? It is possible that bureaucrats
are at odds with journalists, seeing them as interlopers or trouble-makers looking for
scandal, and taking advantage of press freedom to adversely or unfairly report news
events or political developments in their regency or city. Some bureaucrats said that the
Indonesian press in general had become a 'pamphlet press', with reporters having a
negative preconception regarding the conditions or prevailing arrangements in the
localities on which they are reporting, and thus selected the facts that supported such
biases. Whatever the reasons, it seems to be difficult for bureaucrats to create a
congenial and open relationship with journalists. Bureaucrats and journalists have
different interests, especially in regard to what facts and activities of prominent
individuals should be made the object of public inquiry and widespread publication in
the community.
The above findings illustrate that there seems no simple task to define and
assess journalist's professionalism in the new reformasi era. It is also not easy to judge
how far the ambitions of the Indonesian press to promote or provoke change, and to
educate or indoctrinate the people in the era of decentralization is actually being or can
be fulfilled. What seems clear, however, is the determination shown by a large section
of the Indonesian press to fulfill its role as a cultural, reformist, and socially responsible
institution in the era of transition toward a more open and democratic society.
Developing the Indonesian Press
as a Cultural Institution in the Decentralization Era
What also seems clear is that demands for the Indonesian press to further
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develop into a socially responsible and cultural institution do not come only from
journalists and press owners, but also from the public. If sectors of the public feel that
the press and other media are not helping their interests, they can be quick to
demonstrate their dismay and anger. There have been many incidents of this in recent
years, when, for example, groups of people have attacked press offices, or have
obstructed journalists' access to a community or public meeting, or have prevented
them from gathering facts about incidents of social conflict or about activities or
members of particular organizations, and in such situations, and in personal vendettas,
there have been many instances of journalists being violently confronted.
Journalists are exposed to many types of physical violence and non-physical
threats. Table 3 provides some data on the types of physical and non-physical pressures
experienced by journalists in the period March 1998 to April 1999, published by the
Press and Development Study Organization (LSPP, Lembaga Studi Pers dan
Pembangunan) and the Independent Journalists Alliance (AJI, Aliansi Jurnalis
Independen).
Table 3: Sources and Types of Pressure Against Journalists, March 1998 - April 1999
Categories Source of Pressure Physical Pressure Non-physical Pressure
1 Security personnel 11 (55%) 7 (26%)
2 Governmental officials 1 (5%) 9 (33%)
3 Local community groups 5 (25%) 10 (37%)
4 Unknown 3 (15%) 1 (4%)
Source: Suranto et.al, 1999; 64.
The data suggest that, taking physical and non-physical pressure together, local
community incidents account for the highest percentage of cases where journalists
were subject to such interference. In terms of physical (or more violent) pressure,
security guards were identified as being most implicated, while local communities
accounted for 25% of such incidents. This shows that the public communities are
capable of conducting physical violence if the press media are seen to be too inquisitive,
as is seen as having misreported or shown a bias against their interests. It surely is not
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easy for reporters to figure out what are the exact demands and interests of the public,
but in this era of turbulent change, uncertainty, and uneasy transition to democratic
decentralization, the public obviously needs lots of information regarding what is
happening, how to protect and further their legitimate interests (especially in their
interaction with government), how to monitor and influence local politicians, and how
to define and expand their role in civil society. The Indonesian press must play a key
role in helping provide such information, involving clear analyses and informed
commentary on all of these concerns, if it genuinely intends to serve as a cultural
institution of responsible instrument of social reform.
It is always praiseworthy to declare one's sincere intentions to serve the 'public
good' and the nation's 'best interests'. But the Indonesian press experience in the new
era of press freedom, reformasi and decentralization, shows a need for more
professionalism and dedication to make such intentions a permanent and indisputable
reality. Results so far are encouraging, and should stimulate the press to improve its
performance in meeting the public's needs and expectations, so that it is recognized not
only by its readers, and by citizens at large, as well as community leaders, politicians
and bureaucrats, as an honest purveyor of information, valuable cultural institution, a
positive force for change, and a respected profession that a new generation of
intelligent and energetic young recruits will be proud to join.
Public Sphere Encountering the Indonesian Press
As a fourth estate, the Indonesia Pres involvement in a democratization process
is inevitable. In order to do that, as notes by Ashadi Siregar, the Indonesian press has to
warrant: (i) public facts promulgated by the media press are those worth as public
issues; (ii) public issues reported by the press are journalism information; (iii)
journalism information becomes the sources in the process of the creation of public
opinion (2002:xviii). This explanation has showed that the Indonesian press must work
hard to be able to participate in the democratization process.
A further question then occur following this explanation, what kind of
participation should be provided by the press in a real political realm, so it could be
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regarded as involving in a democratization process? Before we could answer this
particular question, we need to discuss several approaches in advance about
participation in the political world. One of these approaches, as notes by Thomas
Meyer and Lew Hinchman, consists of, first, the democracy as a market place. This
model emphasizes that the choice of political elites as a much stipulation to fulfill the
needs of democracy, namely, the creation of political conducts that ensue a policy to
defend public interests. Second, the participatory of democracy. This model explains
that the necessity claim to legitimize a democratic society is: citizens are not only
participate in general election, but also in formulating and maintaining their interests in
various organizations. Third, democratic civil society, known also as civil society
model. It explains that democracy cannot too much to hope for from many institutions
nor organizations, such as systems and political parties, but rests upon the participation
and decision making which should be generated by the civil society (2002:5-7). These
three models, actually, comply with the normative claim of western democracy.
Everyone agrees that the comprehensive and reliable information about social and
political systems should always be available.
For the Indonesian context, the reformation that had overthrown the new order
rezime has received a kind of mandate to materialized civil society (Siregar, 2002:xix).
Suchlike, the participation model that conforms to the press in the development of
democracy is democratic civil society model. Civil society itself, as indicates by Afan
Gaffar, is a type of society, whether individually or group, able to well participate with
the government independently (1997:30). In order to interact and well participate, each
individual and group needs accurate information about political systems from the
media press.
In providing accurate information on political life, free public sphere is always
imperative. Free here means, that is no power could dominate public sphere, such as
the power of government, religion and so on. Public have wide access to various
institutions available in the community life, started from a state bureaucracy,
parliament, justice and the legal systems, interest groups, political parties, and so on.
Reality, however, shows that public sphere after the collapse of the new order had
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become the object of intense competition among many social groups with mass
communalism based. One of the original mass communalisms, according to Ashadi
Siregar is a political party (2002:xxii).
The occurrence of the facts is certainly inevitable. In this particular condition,
a question then comes forth, how do political parties respond to it? In the civil
society, the position of political parties could essentially be a part of the government
sovereignty, namely, political parties who prevail in general election (Gaffar,
1997:29). While the position for the loser, serve as the balance of power of the
government.
Conclusions
The above discussion supports the view that the Indonesian press it itself
undergoing a major reformasi following its emancipation and reconstruction under the
post-Suharto regimes of Habibe, Wahid, and Megawati. In many respects the results
are really impressive. Indonesian journalists are now free to report news according to
the values in which they believe in and that they see best serve the nation's and the
varied community interests. Indonesian press owners no longer must adhere to a
political imperative imposed by a corporatist state authority, and indeed they have
sought rationally to fulfill their economic or commercial imperative of financial
sustainability. But this obsession has not diverted their papers from meeting its cultural
and moral obligations in the era of decentralization and democratization.
In implementing its moral function, the Indonesian press has not limited itself
to reporting political news, or scandalously reveling in reporting corruption or the
self-interest squabbles and infighting of Jakarta-based politicians. Instead, the
Indonesian press has played a generally responsible role in disseminating crucial facts
and other information and in publicizing proposals for reform, in generating new ideas
and components for a new social vision, while also encouraging people to find out and
respond what is happening around them in terms of social, political, and economic
concerns, to protest injurious public policies and to propose new regulations that help
the local community, and to expose, condemn and avoid being involved in KKN. It can
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thus be said that the Indonesian press is meeting its responsibility to help inform and
educate its readers, and to improve the quality of life of Indonesian citizens.
One primary condition that the Indonesian press must address if it is to win and
retain the trust and respect of its readers, the social and political decision-makers, and
the public at large, and this is to maintain and improve its level of professionalism. We
have seen that there is some divergence of perceptions in this regard between
journalists and bureaucrats. In their own opinion, journalists have a high level of
professionalism, but bureaucrats question the self-assurance. In consequence, it is hard
to objectively determine from information available the actual level of professionalism
being practiced throughout the many regions of Indonesia. All that we know is that
responsible parts and organizations of the Indonesian press are conscientiously and
continuously trying to implement its moral function, while local communities are also
exerting pressure on the press to extend and better fulfill its moral function.
What can be concluded is that, with increasing professionalism of its journalists,
the Indonesian press can surely improve its role as a channel of reliable information,
objective analysis, and support for reform and democratization. It can play a critical
role in helping the people and local communities to understand the many changes that
are taking place, the challenges and opportunities that they present, and how to actively
participate in charting their own future on the road to democracy and a better life. The
biggest need and challenge is the development of the Indonesian press as an essential
element in the democratization process. This puts a huge burden on the Indonesian
press and also makes it vulnerable to attack by forces trying to limit or reverse
democratization.***
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